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1  WHAT DO WE MEAN BY THE CAPABILITY APPROACH – AND 
DOES IT MATTER? 
A difficulty in discussing and teaching the capability approach lies in knowing what it 
is. What does it contain, defined in what way? What does it not contain? Is it simply a 
proposition about an appropriate space in which social arrangements should be 
evaluated (Alkire 2005a), or does it for example include implied conceptions of the 
good (Deneulin 2002) and of human personhood (Giovanola 2005)? How does it 
relate to ‘development as freedom’ and the human development approach? Do they 
stand and fall together, or are they separable? 
For years the closest to an integrated statement of the capability approach has 
been a standard length paper by Amartya Sen from the late 1980s, published later in 
the volume The Quality of Life (1993). At that stage Sen was presenting an approach 
in socio-economic valuation that gives an alternative to measurement of income, 
expenditure, or satisfaction. Since then the capability approach (CA) has grown 
enormously. It contains ambiguities and unclear boundaries. Sen has not presented an 
updated equivalent statement; and the collection of his key relevant papers since 1984 
remains in process. His ideas continue to evolve, as seen in moves in preferred 
language from ‘capability’, through (positive) ‘freedoms’, to ‘the opportunity- and 
process- aspects of freedom’. Martha Nussbaum has provided, like Sen, various 
papers and lecture series, but for her quite distinct ‘capabilities’ approach. There too 
we await a comprehensive presentation that was promised in Women and Human 
Development (2000). 
Here is the easiest ambiguity to clarify: ‘the capability approach’ refers to 
Sen’s work, and ‘the capabilities approach’ to Nussbaum’s (see e.g. Nussbaum 2000, 
Gasper 1997). Yet even their close associate Hilary Putnam writes of the ‘capabilities 
approach’ (2002: vii) when he in fact refers to Sen’s work. ‘Capability’ is the full set 
of attainable alternative lives that face a person; it is a counterpart to the conventional 
microeconomics notion of an opportunity set defined in commodities space, but is 
instead defined in the space of functionings. ‘Capabilities’, in contrast, conveys a 
more concrete focus on specific attainable functionings in a life, and connects to 
ordinary language’s reference to persons’ skills and powers and the current business 
jargon of ‘core capabilities’. 
Other matters of specification are more difficult. Since Sen’s capability 
approach has been self-consciously lightly explicitly specified, it can as Robeyns   2
(2000, 2003) noted, be variously elaborated. Further, as it spreads in a variety of fields 
of practice it naturally evolves. Adjustments, extensions, partnerships and working 
simplifications are required. Some that are made may endanger the rationale of the 
approach; for example, if GDP per capita is reinstated as the supposed measure (or 
proxy) for human freedoms/capabilities in a supposedly separate sphere of ‘material 
aspects of welfare’ (e.g. Kuklys & Robeyns 2004). Elsewhere, subjective well-being 
measures may become re-endorsed (see the discussion in Teschl & Comim 2005). We 
need a formulation of the approach which reflects its rationale and can adequately guide 
its applications, elaborations and evolution. 
This paper offers a specification of current core elements of the capability 
approach from Sen. The purpose is not to fix CA, which should be encouraged to 
grow; instead it is to promote growth, through aiding self-awareness, clarity, and 
learning. I have taken into account and critically analyse a series of recent formulations 
published by some of Sen’s close associates (e.g., Alkire 2002, 2005a; Robeyns 2000, 
2005; Kuklys & Robeyns 2004). Section 2 begins with the approach’s rationale based 
in the problematique of well-being and the attractions of emphasising human agency. 
Section 3 looks at the component features of the CA as an evaluation approach, to 
show how it is more than merely a criterion. The larger task of specifying underlying 
assumptions of the approach as a contribution in normatively-oriented humanistic 
social science, for example its stances on methodology and personhood, is left for 
another occasion. Section 4 locates and anchors CA within a system of partner or 
cognate discourses from the human development family. Section 5 looks at how CA’s 
abstracted concepts fare in practice. Section 6 reviews the main arguments and the 
dangers that face CA, not least that vague specification can bring overconfidence and 
misguided choices in operationalization. 
Does vagueness about the content of the capability approach and about how it 
relates to other bodies of work – human development, human security, ‘development 
as freedom’, Sen’s work as a whole – really matter? Underdefinition allows everyone 
to perceive space for themselves in a project. It gives, fittingly, a lot of freedom for 
people of varied backgrounds to grow out from a small kernel in diverse ways, 
according to their interests and skills. Nussbaum’s more specific sister version perhaps 
shows the risks and resistance to identifying areas where one must in practice make 
choices and then proposing some specific choices. But underdefinition also has 
disadvantages for a research programme: the programme remains hard to   3
communicate, to teach, to use with at least some potential cooperators, and to assess 
and therefore improve. It remains unpersuasive to those who look for clarity, let alone 
precision. The risk increases that ‘anything goes’ during the inevitable simplifications 
in operationalization. In policy programmes too, lack of clarity on core principles 
allows all to claim the CA mantle yet may only briefly defer divisions. 
 
 
2  RATIONALE OF THE CAPABILITY APPROACH 
Sen’s approach arose from a dissatisfaction with subjective states and command over 
resources as concepts or measures of well-being or advantage; and from the wish for a 
concept that presents persons as reasoning agents with the right to make choices. 
 
The well-being problematique 
Four main considerations, then, support the capability approach: 
1. The capability approach captures the intuitively attractive idea that people 
should be equal with respect to effective freedom and so has some initial 
plausibility. 
2. Because it is attentive to the fact that preferences and values are sometimes 
adaptive, it compares favorably with views that focus on "subjective" 
achievements. 
3. Because it is attentive to issues of responsibility and diversity of aims, it 
contrasts favorably with views that focus on achievements (however 
understood). 
4. Because it is attentive to diversity in abilities to transform means into 
achievements, it is preferable to views that focus on equality of means (J. Cohen 
1993: 7). 
Reflecting on what would be a normatively relevant concept of (in)equality, Sen had 
asked ‘equality of what?’. He compared various concepts of advantage – in other 
words, concepts of the ‘what’ whose distribution we evaluate. He argued that 
normative priority could not attach to (a) satisfactions, because these subjective 
outcomes are too dependent on personality, acculturation, prior expectations and other 
framing factors; nor, more generally, to (b) any other sort of outcome, because 
outcomes depend on how well people have used their opportunities; nor to (c) any sort 
of input or means, because their sufficiency and relevance varies according to the 
nature of the person concerned. Instead priority should be given to (d) the effective 
freedoms which people have to achieve prioritised outcomes. 
Settling on a focus by finding arguments in its favour and arguments against 
each alternative, leaves open the possibility that strong arguments also exist against   4
the category that has been placed at the end of the line waiting to collect the prize. 
Qizilbash (1997) pointed out, for example, that effective freedoms depend partly on a 
person’s capacities built up through his/her own efforts, so that lack of capability does 
not necessarily establish a claim against others. Therefore whether capability has 
normative priority or is simply one more normatively relevant category remains open 
for discussion. We return to this in section 3. In practice, the capability approach gives 
normative priority to capability; otherwise why call it ‘the capability approach’? 
 
Figure 1 
The well-being puzzle triangle: inputs and outcomes (source: Gasper 2005a) 
 





                 Other inputs                                                                          Other inputs 
      Economic Inputs to be-ing, 
  notably income 
Cohen’s ‘four main considerations’ are reflected in figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 indicates 
the classic problematique around well-being. Economic ‘inputs’ to living (notably 
possessions and income) have patchy relationships to both objective well-being 
(OWB: achievement/functionings in non-feelings dimensions that are reflectively 
valued as important, e.g. physical and mental health, longevity, security) and well-
being (SWB: feelings of happiness, satisfaction or fulfilment).
1 In addition, subjective 
and objective well-being in these senses are not well correlated. Hence the sides of the 
triangle are not marked by arrows. Reasons include: that well-being is fundamentally 
                                                 
1 If one dropped the ‘non-feelings’ condition for ‘objective well-being’ then the SWB and OWB 
categories would overlap, when feelings of happiness and satisfaction are amongst the reflective 
priorities of the mandated decision-maker. If, further, the mandated decision-maker is a person 
choosing for her self, then OWB overlaps in character also with reflectively considered as opposed to 
directly felt SWB, without being identical to it. We will see these aspects, but also others, in Sen’s 
capability notion. ‘Subjective’ refers here to what is being measured, not how it is measured: SWB 
research has found that SWB can be reliably measured, including by self-report. That is a separate 
question from whether the feelings are a good reflection of a person’s situation.   5
influenced by not just economic inputs (money and things directly obtainable with 
money), but also ‘non-economic’ factors such as family relations, friendships, beliefs, 
purposeful activity, exercise and health, and so on; that sometimes economic inputs 
have no significant or sustained direct impact on objective- or even subjective well-
being; and that acquiring more economic inputs is quite often indirectly competitive 




Sen’s addition of attention to potential outcomes 
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Sen extended this discussion by adding the category of potentials to that of 
achievements; specifically, potential functionings, not actual functionings as 
measured in studies of objective well-being in most work on social indicators and 
quality of life. As shown in figure 2, inputs contribute to opportunities for achieving 
functionings and satisfactions but do not guarantee their achievement.
2 Whether 
opportunities promote well-being depends on how they are used. Sen expects that 
                                                 
2 Direct connections could exist from the holding of economic inputs through to subjective well-being 
if ownership is a source of satisfaction (hence the long dotted line in fig. 2); and then through to 
objective well being, if say subjective satisfaction is good for health.   6
freedoms conduce to both objective and subjective well-being but that the outcomes 
are not guaranteed, and he anyway grants freedoms an independent normative status. 
The non-guaranteed links in figure 2 concern not only those along the sides of 
the triangle, notably the use of freedoms. The middle bottom arrow is not reliable. The 
operation of an economic system, and the generation of economic inputs to being, can 
not only compete against maintenance of other inputs vital for well-being, but can 
contribute to un-freedoms through moulding of preferences. Jon Elster rather than Sen 
has emphasised this: ‘There certainly comes a point beyond which the frustrating 
search for material welfare no longer represents a liberation from adaptive 
preferences, but rather an enslavement to addictive preferences’ (Elster 1982: 233). 
Sen’s capability approach originated then in a wish for welfare economics to 
join other social and human sciences (including health sciences) in looking at OWB, 
not merely at the economic inputs to living or at SWB. The dissatisfaction with SWB 
arose from adaptive preferences (when people come to take hardship for granted or 
luxury for granted), but also from the wider range of framing factors that influence 
SWB by moulding preferences and satisfactions, from infancy onwards, even if 
preferences become somewhat more fixed in adulthood. The dissatisfaction applies 
therefore even for reflectively reasoningly discursively self-assessed SWB, not only 
for directly experienced happiness, even if less so.
3 
Within OWB, Sen focused in a novel way. He focuses primarily, at least in his 
theoretical writing, on ‘capability’ – access to OWB – rather than on OWB 
achievement. This capability category is a complex hybrid. It is not an SWB variant, 
since even if self-assessed it concerns not feelings but instead options for 
achievement; and like all variants of the potentially misleadingly named OWB 
category, it is normative, for it involves an accounting in terms of normatively 
prioritized aspects of being. But it is not a standard OWB measure, at least not in 
Sen’s theoretical writings. It means the access to those functionings ‘which people 





                                                 
3 The procedural contrast between these types of (hedonic) SWB is not identical to Ryan & Deci’s 
widely used substantive contrast between eudaimonic and hedonic well-being. The latter means 
feelings of happiness; the former concerns feelings of meaningfulness, purposefulness and fulfilment.     7
The ‘agency’ emphasis in this approach to well-being 
‘The capability approach captures the intuitively attractive idea that people should be 
equal with respect to effective freedom’, said Cohen (1993: 7). The idea attracts 
because it uses a picture of persons as agents who have their own goals (including not 
only for themselves), make their own choices, and are not mere receptacles for 
resource-inputs and satisfaction; who, in Aristotelian language, live through the 
exercise of practical reason. 
The focus on freedom covers the process aspect of freedom, not only the 
opportunity aspect of freedom. The ‘capability’ label that Sen chose for the latter 
aspect might not then be adequate as label for the whole approach; indeed he for a 
while switched to a large extent to freedom language. However, while not amending 
his opportunity-freedom definition of capability and never refining usage in the way 
that Nussbaum does to distinguish different aspects of capability, Sen’s concern for 
agency has been protected by the connotations of the term ‘capability’, connotations 
which Nussbaum makes explicit. One cannot have capability in the sense of 
opportunity-freedom if one lacks capability in the agency senses, of capacity and 
skills to think and act. 
 
 
3  SPECIFICATION, I: CAPABILITY APPROACH OR CAPABILITY 
CRITERION? - FEATURES OF ‘THE’ CAPABILITY APPROACH AS 
A VALUATION APPROACH 
I suggest that the approach has six major features, although it is ambiguous about the 
fourth and the sixth.
4 
1  An orientation to use a broad variety of sources of information. 
2  A language, with novel categories, to describe that variety. 
3  A prioritization amongst categories, notably the prioritization of capability. In an 
extreme variant, only capability matters. 
4  A principle that prioritization of capabilities for individuals is to be reasoned. 
5  A principle that prioritization for groups is to be by public debate and democratic 
decision. 
6  The categories of basic capabilities and threshold levels. 
Standing at the margin of the approach is the idea of a list of basic capabilities. 
                                                 
4 This section elaborates and refines the specification in Gasper 2004b, chapter 7, and draws also on 
Gasper 2002, Gasper & van Staveren 2003.   8
Feature 1 – Orientation to a broad variety of sources of information 
The first feature is the principle that there are more types of information relevant for 
the assessment of well-being and quality of life than those considered in mainstream 
economics (people’s assets, incomes, purchases, and stated or imputed levels of 
satisfaction or preference-fulfilment). The root of the capability approach is an 
insistence on referring to a wide range of types of information, notably about how 
people actually live – what they do and are – and their freedom – what they are able to 
do and be. Sen further stresses that besides (possible) outcomes we must consider the 
inter-personal distribution of outcomes, persons’ rights, and other features of the 
decision situation. 
Sometimes this first feature is downgraded in use, if the focus narrows to only 
capability. Sometimes it is emphasised, as when Comim (2005) reviews reasons 
whether to bring back in the much more easily measured SWB category. 
Taking into account more types of information is no breakthrough for the 
capability approach. It has been done since at least the 1960s, in enormous streams of 
work on social indicators, quality of life, and varieties of subjective well-being. Sen’s 
contribution is instead to help to focus, organise and rationalise that work. Vitally, he 
has ‘(la)belled the cat’ of conventional policy economics literature, by drawing out 
and naming its utilitarian elements and assumptions, and showing how it excludes 
swathes of relevant information.
5 He then builds an alternative approach to valuation, 
grounded in an explicit philosophical perspective. He has highlighted the alternative 
by giving it a name and a distinctive language; this profiles the approach and its 
categories and assists cumulative work. The approach thus certainly contains also 
features 2 and 3 below: a language, within which a concept of capability is given 
evaluative priority. 
 
Feature 2 – A set of categories 
Sen’s family of categories constitutes a language for discussing this wider range of 
considerations. He added several concepts to those conventional in micro- and welfare 
economics (income, goods, and utility). One could list each new concept as a distinct 
                                                 
5 To ‘bell the cat’ means, in English, to identify and make noticeable a potential menace – as by putting 
a bell around the neck of a cat.   9
component of the approach; but since they are interlinked we should treat them as a 
family, a language. The main concepts are as follows. 
Functionings are components of how a person lives – for example, one’s 
health status, or arguing about one’s rights. Together a set (or n-tuple) of such 
functionings makes up a person’s life. A person’s capability is (definition I): the set of 
alternative n-tuples of functionings she could attain (‘capability set’), in other words 
the alternative lives open to her, the extent of her positive freedom; or (definition II): 
the valuation of her positive freedom, her access to OWB, based on the range and 
quality of attainable reasoningly valued outcomes she has to choose between. Sen has 
generally used definition I, but with constant stress on ‘the capability to achieve 
valuable functionings’ (1993: 31) and on judgement of opportunity-freedom 
according to the opportunities to attain what ‘one has reason to value’ (e.g. 2002: 
519). Leading exponents such as Alkire and Robeyns in their recent expositions adopt 
definition II, which gives ‘capability’ a selective, value-guided character; as, 
implicitly, does the UN definition of development as expansion of capabilities. 
Expanded opportunities for life-paths which are reasoningly disvalued do not raise 
‘capability’ by definition II.
6 
Capabilities in the plural refers for Sen to the particular functionings that may 
be attainable for a person; for example, the ability to speak up about one’s rights. Sen 
argues that an agent’s situation can be relevantly evaluated in a number of ways: (1) 
by her own valued functionings (‘well-being achievement’), not merely her utility 
(satisfaction or preference fulfilment, actual or imputed); (2) by the outcomes in terms 
of her values, including for other people, beings and things (‘agency achievement’); 
and by what she is able to achieve, both in terms of her own well-being (3 – ‘well-
being freedom’) and of her actual values (4 – ‘agency freedom’), including her values 
for other people, beings and things. His primary category of capability was well-being 
freedom, which concerns the functionings that a person can herself attain. 
 
                                                 
6 Robeyns: ‘the freedoms or valuable opportunities (capabilities) to lead the kind of lives they want to 
lead’ (2005: 95; emphasis added); and Alkire: ‘Capability refers to a person or group’s freedom to 
promote or achieve valuable functionings’ (2005a: 121; emphasis added). However, Alkire’s next 
sentence cites Sen using definition I (‘[Capability] represents the various combinations of functionings 
that the the person can achieve’, 1992: 40), and we find almost identical formulations by him in 
Development as Freedom (Sen 1999: 75) and On Economic Inequality (Sen & Foster 1998: 200).   10
Feature 3: A stance concerning which levels have ethical priority 
Sen and most other proponents of the capability approach seem to typically rank 
spaces in which to measure well-being and equity as follows (in descending order): 
(i)   capability (as personal Well-Being Freedom), the valuation of the set of life 
paths a person could follow; placed first because of a priority to freedom and 
self-responsibility; 
(ii)     (valued) functionings: how people actually live; 
(iii-1) utility, whether interpreted as declared feelings of satisfaction, or the 
fulfilment of preferences, or the fact of choice: all these are placed lower, 
because choices and preferences may have been formed without much 
reflection or in situations of deprivation of exposure, information or options. 
We cannot presume a person’s satisfaction from her choices, since agents do 
not only make conscious and error-free choices. Despite these dangers, 
satisfaction can still be treated as a significant type of functioning; 
(iii-2) goods/commodities used – this criterion is ranked low because goods/ 
commodities are means not ends, and because people have different needs and 
wants. 
Sometimes proponents declare that the CA involves only commitment to capability as 
a relevant space, not to its priority, but they commonly then elsewhere accord it 
priority, as is implied by the very name ‘Capability Approach’. Sen himself often 
acknowledges the relevance of several types of information (see e.g. Sen 2002: 83-4), 
but typically gives priority to capability (e.g., Sen 1999: 3, 76). Alkire starts 
cautiously: ‘If equality is to be demanded in any space – and most theories of justice 
advocate equality in some space – it is to be demanded in the space of capabilities’ 
(Alkire 2005a: 122).
7 Then she asserts priority: ‘social states should be defined 
primarily in the space of human capabilities’ (ibid.: 125; emphasis added). Comim is 
unambiguous: priority to capability space provides the ‘“normative anchor” for 
assessing HWB [human well-being, and] is at the core of the contribution of the CA, 
that does more than simply argue for a broader informational space in making 
                                                 
7 ‘The space of capabilities’ in fact covers two spaces: those of well-being freedom and agency 
freedom. Alkire earlier lists also well-being achievement and agency achievement when referring to 
‘the internal plurality of capability space’ (2005a: 122), but would not strictly include these 
achievement spaces as capability spaces.   11
normative evaluations’ (Comim 2005: 165). Three possible more detailed 
formulations deserve mention. 
 
Variant 3B: Priority to capability as a policy rule 
The normative priority given to capability could be interpreted as a policy rule to give 
people freedom and ‘let them make their own mistakes’, rather than as an evaluative 
rule that ‘capabilities deserve more value-weighting than do functionings’. Capability 
(WBF) is then seen as an appropriate measure of advantage, of how advantaged a 
person is, rather than of well-being (WBA), even though it might well contribute to 
the latter. In contrast, Functionings concern well-being. The very term ‘functioning’ 
better matches ‘being’. Such a policy rule is not relevant for children, but becomes 
more so as they learn and mature. 
 
Variant 3C: A claim that we should look only at the capability level 
This more extreme version of feature 3 is not the mainstream but is quite widespread 
in discussion of human development, seen in formulations like ‘development is the 
expansion of capabilities’. For Alkire (2005a: 117): ‘according to the capability 
approach, the objective of both justice and poverty reduction (for example) should be 
to expand the freedom that deprived people have to enjoy “valuable beings and 
doings”’ (emphasis added). Sen sometimes has similar formulations (e.g.: ‘The issue 
ultimately, is what freedom does have a person have...’; Sen 2000: 29). But he appears 
overwhelmingly a pluralist: e.g., ‘happiness is of obvious and direct relevance to well-
being, [although] it is inadequate as a [sole] representation of well-being’ (1985: 189). 
Comim argues that subjective information should be attended to because the spirit of the 
capability approach is to use multiple types of information, not just one (2005: 231). 
 
Variant 3D: Prioritizing should be situation-dependent, not situation-independent 
For Robeyns, in judging people’s advantage, one should look at ‘the space of 
functionings and/or capabilities, depending on the issue at hand’ (2005: 103). This is 
Sen’s usual style. Which space is relevant and has priority will depend on the case. In 
relation to ‘young children or the mentally disabled’ or ‘all situations of extreme 
material and bodily deprivation in very poor societies or communities’ – a series of 
enormously important contexts – the space of functionings is often more appropriate 
(Robeyns 2005: 101).   12
Feature 4: Priority capabilities are those which ‘people have reason to value’ 
When we come to prioritise amongst capabilities, for a person, the criterion is: priority 
to ‘what people have reason to value’. This feature contains two, potentially 
competitive, principles: an emphasis on reason, and a liberal valuation that people 
should choose for themselves. Competition between them arises when people choose 
in poorly reasoned ways. ‘Reason’ carries here the connotation of ‘good reason’ or 
‘well-reasoned’, otherwise the phrase ‘have reason to’ would be superfluous: ‘what 
people value’ would suffice. It does not connote that good reasoning can draw one 
conclusion only. 
The potential tension between principles of reason and own-choice is more 
veiled when we talk of ‘people’, ‘we’ and ‘they’, rather than of ‘individuals’, ‘a 
person’, ‘one’ or ‘she’. It remains unspecified whether in a group process authorized 
agents will draw reasoned conclusions for others. Sen sometimes writes ‘what we 
value’ (e.g., 1992: 31), which is on its own ambiguous: Is there to be multi-person 
valuation of each person’s state? Is he referring on to cases of public debate about 
public policy? Robeyns rightly observes that: ‘the capability approach is a clearly a 
theory within the liberal school of thought in political philosophy’ (Robeyns 2005: 
95); liberalism is though a large kingdom of species. Sen has throughout his career 
been insistently a reflective liberal, propounding that valuation is to be a reflective 
informed exercise, not simply assertion of whatever one currently directly feels; it is 
to be value judgement in the true sense. He characteristically writes of what ‘one has 
reason to value’ (e.g., 1999: 74), and his most famous book could strictly be called 
‘Development as Reasoned Freedom’. One implication, pursued especially by 
Nussbaum, concerns the importance of capabilities for valuing, including capabilities 
for reasoning. 
So common, however, is the variant formulation which dissolves the tension 
by dropping the words ‘have reason to’, that we must note it separately. 
 
Variant 4B: Priority capabilities are those which people value, or even simply want 
Alkire presents an unqualified liberal variant: ‘the capability approach is a proposition, 
and the proposition is this: that social arrangements should be evaluated according to 
the extent of freedom people have to promote or achieve functionings they value’ 
(Alkire 2005a: 122), the ‘freedoms to do and be what they value’ (p.125). Evaluation 
is to be by the people themselves, no one else; and by what they value, not necessarily   13
have reason to value. Robeyns presents a yet more liberal formulation: ‘What is 
ultimately important is that people have the freedoms or valuable opportunities 
(capabilities) to lead the kind of lives they want to lead, to do what they want to do 
and be the person they want to be.’ (2005: 95; emphasis added). Undesirable wants – 
for example, to suppress women or blacks or immigrants or non co-religionists – 
disappear here from view. 
Part of the rationale for the CA was that SWB is an unreliable yardstick. The 
more that CA reintroduces preferences into its evaluative calculus, as the principle for 
selecting and prioritizing capabilities, the more it must face the issues of adaptive and 
moulded preferences (see e.g. Teschl & Comim 2005). The implication should be at 
least to emphasise informed and educated preference and capable choice – issues 
examined by authors such as Brandt, Nussbaum and Scitovsky, but perhaps not yet 
sufficiently mainstreamed in the capability approach. 
Taking distance from individuals’ direct preferences and felt utility reflects 
that the capability approach is a language in and for public policy discourse. Given 
that it works at a policy level with a capability currency, how to operationalize ideas 
such as informed and educated preferences about capabilities, in multi-person and 
intra- and inter-organizational settings, is not automatically obvious. This leads us to 
features 5 and 6. 
 
Feature 5: Public procedures for prioritizing and threshold-setting 
Sen incorporates a stress on public discussion and decision procedures for prioritizing 
which and whose capabilities (e.g., 1999: 148). This is for where a criterion of 
‘whatever people have reason to value’ in individual deliberations does not suffice – 
where markets, complemented by adequate support for capacities in information 
receipt and assessment, preference assessment and decision-making, cannot 
satisfactorily handle society’s choices; in other words, for the classic realms of public 
goods and public policy. Public discussion is also important for educating the 
preferences at work in markets. 
Robeyns notes that ‘In Sen’s case, it is not at all clear how these processes of 
public reasoning and democracy are going to take place … at present not enough 
work seems to have been carried out on the kind of democratic institutions that the 
“capability approach in practice” would require’ (2005: 106, 107). One of the 
approach’s relatively empty boxes is called democracy. Not coincidentally, we saw   14
that the distinction between features 4 and 5 is often blurred. Since the approach is 
quintessentially a public policy approach—for individuals are unlikely to decide 
against their own preferences – feature 5 is more central: group decision making for 
groups, not for solitary individuals. It requires more evidence-based attention to forms 
of democracy, not only wishful thinking. 
 
Feature 6: A category, and even a list, of basic capabilities 
Pre-set lists of priority capabilities could be competitive with feature 5, public 
procedures for prioritization; lists could, however, emerge from such procedures. Sen 
makes no such formal list, unlike Nussbaum. But in practice, Sen and the HDRs use 
notions of basic capabilities (basic for survival or dignity) and required thresholds for 
minimum necessary attainment (e.g., Anand & Sen 2000: 85; and in the HDRs’ 
specification of equity). His list of five basic ‘instrumental freedoms’ is also not so 
different (Sen 1999: 38ff.). As Stewart and Deneulin note, ‘In practical work, Sen 
[accepts] that to be healthy, well nourished, and educated are basic capabilities, 
which, presumably, he would argue, would always get democratic support. In effect, 
this shifts the approach to one that is almost identical with the BN [basic needs 
approach]’, except that it is has much broader scope and a more elaborate 
philosophical foundation (2002: 64). 
The problem is this. In human history the health, nourishment and education 
of all groups of the population do not always receive democratic support: some groups 
can be, unnecessarily, excluded: vicitimized for example on grounds of ethnicity, 
caste or religion. Feature 6 guards against those cases where agents’ reasoning leads 
or is led towards behaviour seriously damaging to the agents or to others. The 
function of a notion and list of basics is to entrench – perhaps in a constitution or bill 
of rights – and protect some fundamentals against the incursions of power. Feature 6 
reduces to feature 5 if ‘basic’ is only a label for the priorities chosen through feature 
5’s procedures within a political community. We refer though to something more: to a 
special priority category that has an entrenched status, a moral and constitutional 
precedence, above the normal political deliberations: the set of rights that cannot be 
taken away, even by an ordinary majority. 
Sen thus works with: (a) a category of ‘basic capabilities’; (b) an incomplete 
list of basic capabilities, not derived by bottom-up democratic decision-making; and 
(c) an acceptance of the idea of more extensive lists, provided that they are derived by   15
democratic decision-making case-by-case in each era in each political community. 
This recognition will not remove all the disagreement with Nussbaum over lists, 
especially if Sen holds to an idealized notion of democracy; but it does considerably 
limit it. Conversely, Nussbaum’s rather too sweeping advocacy of a list does not 
exhaust the case for lists. 
Much disagreement can be removed by better distinguishing types of list. Lists 
come in many types: as proposed definitive statements or as indicative suggestions; as 
exact prescriptions or as requiring local interpretation; as purportedly complete or 
explicitly partial statements (see figure 3). Insofar as a priorities list is vague, 
incomplete or, especially, indicative then it becomes more compatible with feature 5: 
democratic political process. Arguably, Nussbaum should redefine her proposed list 
further in that direction, to make it more relevant. Still, there are limits to that 
direction: a list of basic capabilities that did not at all constrain ordinary political 
process would have no point. The purpose of a list such as Nussbaum’s, like the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is precisely to set limits. She may confuse 
that valid and essential role with the question of the appropriate form for her 
individual contribution to the debate, where a stress on its indicative nature would be 
more effective (Gasper 2003). 
 
Fig. 3 
Types of lists of priorities, with illustrations 




EXACT  Complete (relative to 
the specified purpose) 
Some religious systems   
  Incomplete  Some other religious systems Millennium  Development 
Goals
8 
VAGUE  Complete (relative to 
the specified purpose) 
Nussbaum’s list as 
sometimes presented 
Nussbaum’s list as 
occasionally presented 
  Incomplete  Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 




Let us distinguish then at least: (1) Lists of basic capabilities that constrain the 
operation of a state, that are set domestically, and for example included in the national 
constitution; (2) A list of basic capabilities that constrains states, set internationally, 
                                                 
8 The MDGs are indicative (they can be adapted in specifics by each country) but not vague (for they 
have highly specific targets).   16
incomplete but covering central priorities for, say, health and education; such as 
perhaps in the MDGs; and (3) A list of basic capabilities, set internationally to 
constrain states, and extensive in scope, such as Nussbaum’s or – more extensive still 
– the Universal Declaration of 1948. 
 
Review 
Several points arise from the specification exercise. 
First, the capability approach would hardly deserve to be called an approach if 
it consisted of a single feature, whether a catholic stance on types of information 
(feature 1) or a normative prioritization of just one type (feature 3). In the latter case 
we should speak only of the capability criterion, not of an approach. It is the attempt 
to approach policy realities that merits the term ‘capability approach’. This occurs 
through features 4 to 6, which are thus integral parts of the ‘approach’. 
Second, the approach not only contains multiple features but allows of various 
selections and combinations of the features. So we find various versions in use. We 
could easily therefore talk of capability approaches, rather than of ‘the’ CA. 
Third, some of the features are potentially in tension, internally or with each 
other: feature 1 calls for broad information while feature 3 calls for normative priority 
to (and sometimes even a sole focus on) capability; feature 4 calls for both reason and 
value; feature 6 tries to limit or structure the space for the political determination of 
priorities that was introduced by feature 5. The tensions are not necessarily failings 
but reflect the realities of policy practice and attempts to construct a balanced system. 
The conflicting pulls increase the scope for very different versions of the approach. 
Lastly, the tensions have sometimes been managed by vagueness or 
ambiguity. Proponents can adopt an elastic specification: sometimes only feature 1 is 
avowed, to indicate modesty and wide relevance, but at other times several or all 
features are embraced, to indicate the approach’s power. Fleurbaey is not the only 
reader who feels ‘some ambiguity in Sen’s formulation in [Development as Freedom] 
about whether his proposal is more a useful framework within which debates can take 
place, or a particular approach which must be defended against rivals’ (2002: 73). It 
could be more helpful to clearly distinguish and work with both constructs, indeed 
with several variants, rather than struggle on with supposedly one, vague and 
confusing entity. The point applies on a larger scale too, beyond the six features we 
mentioned. Alkire, after identification of the CA with feature 3 (‘the capability   17
approach is a proposition…’; 2005a: 122, cited with variant 4B earlier) suggests ‘that 
further developments of the capability approach should consider [Sen’s other] 
conceptual writings and should not restrict attention to the bare definitions of 
capability and functioning and the proposition already outlined’ (2005a: 123). She 
sees the approach as providing relevant categories across many related areas, while 
leaving specific weighting and application to informed participants (p.128). 
The six features we discussed have been those in the foreground of the 
capability approach led by Sen. To look at its background assumptions, concerning 
methodology, personhood and value would require another paper or papers.
9 Here 
Section 5 will look instead at the core concept of capability (part of feature 2) and at 
the exercise of moving from an abstracted and notional entity through to choices in 
the real world. In doing so we will touch further on features 3 to 6 – priority ranking 
of spaces; and priority ranking of capabilities by reason, preference, political process, 
and/or the political institutionalization of an entrenched category of ‘basics’ – though 
not in terms of their philosophical status, but as elements in the exercise of connecting 
the capability concept to practice. Before that, section 4 connects the capability 
approach to some closely related discourses. 
 
 
4  PARTNERS: CAPABILITY ‘APPROACH’ OR HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH? – LOCATING AND ANCHORING 
THE CA WITHIN A SET OF COGNATE DISCOURSE 
‘Development as Freedom’ 
Two other features might arguably be added to the list of main features in the 
capability approach. They figure centrally in Sen’s work of the past decade, notably in 
the book Development as Freedom.  
One is the category of ‘process freedom’. Sen’s capability concept concerns 
‘opportunity freedom’: the range of favourably valued life opportunities which are 
attainable for a person. It refers to attainable end-states. Process freedom concerns the 
person’s role in decisionmaking. Alkire (2005b) suggests that we should in general 
describe and compare alternatives in terms of both criteria.
10 Formally speaking, 
                                                 
9 A start is made in Gasper (2002), sections 5 and 6, and Gasper (2003). The latter paper contrasts 
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s approaches by reference to their positions in a series of background dimensions. 
10 She notes however that process freedom would not be a central concern in many vital cases involving 
young children (nutrition, immunization, primary school attendance) (Alkire 2005b: 8).   18
however, Sen considers process freedom as outside his conception of capability. It 
falls outside the capability approach, but within a wider theoretical construction – 
‘development as freedom’. If Sen adopted a richer conceptualization of capability, 
like Nussbaum’s which includes attention to the potentials and skills which are the 
basis of agency, it would feel natural to still include process freedom concerns under 
the capability approach heading. 
Development as Freedom and the associated work contain more than a 
normative definition of development as freedom and a relabelling of the capability 
criterion as ‘opportunity freedom’. Unlike CA, it essays also an explanatory theory of 
development: that the path to development is freedom. If development is defined as 
freedom, risk of tautology looms; similarly if we judge whether people were really 
free according to when they developed. Substantively, emphasis is placed on five 
proposed key ‘instrumental freedoms’ and their hypothesised complementarity as a 
set of factors that contain a normative and explanatory core of good human 
development. The five are: political freedoms; economic facilities; social 
opportunities; transparency guarantees; and protective security (Sen 1999: 38-40). 
This model is a second candidate for addition to our specification of key features of 
the capability approach. But it goes beyond evaluation, and one can wait to see if it 
wins much support and endures. At present, it could figure as part of a distinctly 
labelled special variant. 
Various commentators now argue that the label ‘the capability approach’ is 
inadequate. Jerome Segal (1998) suggested instead ‘the functioning and capability 
approach’; for not only is functioning nearly always the operational proxy for 
capability, it has normative significance in itself, including for most CA proponents. 
Ingrid Robeyns (2005) proposes as we saw a priority status for functionings in a huge 
swathe of work, on grounds of inherent appropriateness not only of practical ease. 
David Crocker has suggested that we refer instead to ‘the agency approach’, since 
Sen’s framework stresses the agent’s capacity to formulate and pursue reasoned 
objectives. Sen for a while preferred the ‘development as freedom’ label for popular 
audiences. That encountered significant criticism, and Sen has stayed instead with the 
label ‘Capability’ in the name of the new Human Development and Capability 
Association for research. This paper focuses accordingly. 
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Human Development and Human Security 
How does Sen’s CA fit into the larger story of work on human development? The 
Human Development approach (HDA) bears the imprints of Mahbub ul Haq, Paul 
Streeten, Richard Jolly and others, not only of Sen, although he is the main progenitor 
of many aspects, including the Human Development Index and recent attempts to 
connect to human rights and culture. Both approaches are deliberately specified in a 
broad-brush, open way. Sen describes the Human Development Approach as not a 
Hinayana (Little Vehicle) but a Mahayana (Great Vehicle) school, one that readily 
accomodates many variants. Its Human Security offspring is equally broad, which has 
brought some vagueness and confusion in usage. 
Sen’s CA is an evaluation approach. The HDA is much more, being also an 
approach to explanation and to policy, which uses CA as an evaluation approach and 
as one guide to identify what is important to explain and to include in a policy 
framework. HDA likewise includes Sen’s entitlements analysis as part of its 
explanatory armoury, for investigating issues indicated as normatively important. 
Thus not only has HDA broadened the range of objectives routinely considered in 
development debate and planning, it broadens the scope of analyses and breaks out 
from conventional disciplinary and national boundaries. Epitomized by the work of 
Haq (e.g., 1999), it attempts ‘joined-up thinking’ not distorted by those boundaries 
(Gasper & Truong 2005). In addition, the HD approach takes a step towards ‘joined-
up feeling’, for its field of valuative reference is all humans, wheresoever in the 
world. 
Its sibling or offspring, Human Security discourse goes further, by a focus on 
securing the basics of decent human lives, through attention to stability, peace, and 
sufficiency for all. This more concrete focus strengthens its roles in promoting fellow-
feeling, motivation and action (Gasper 2005b). The Human Security elaboration of 
thinking about human development and capabilities is less risk-prone than the highly 
generalized ‘Development as Freedom’ path, in which dangers of inappropriate 
operationalization of the capability approach are heightened (Gasper & van Staveren 
2003). 
Dreze and Sen’s joint work (1989, 2002) provides a happier balance. Writing 
in particular policy contexts with which they are closely familiar, Dreze and Sen make 
judicious practical choices about balancing different factors in explanation, about 
operationalization and measurement, value priorities, and choice of policy means. The   20
wider range of values used in evaluation still has a unifying focus, on how individuals 
live and can live. This focus energizes and guides the work. Firstly, in choice of topic, 
we see a priority attention to human issues of hunger, longevity, health, abilities to 
understand and communicate, security and freedom. Secondly, along the pathways of 
analysis, attention goes to the distinctive situations of different groups (such as 
different occupational groups’ access to food, and women’s and girls’ access to health 
services), and causes and effects are traced through--regardless of disciplinary 
tradition--to people’s functionings and capabilities. Thirdly, the data analysis is led by 
concern for socio-economic significance above statistical significance (McCloskey & 
Ziliak 1996). Fourthly, in policy design, the focus on clear high-level ends brings an 
innovative and broad perspective on means – thus for example, the capability 
approach gives much attention ‘to inputs other than food as determinants of 
nutritional functioning and capability’ (Dreze & Sen 1989: 44) – and an orientation to 
employing ‘an adequate plurality’ of policy means in order to respect the specific 
capability determinants of specific groups (ibid: 102). Lastly, the need to respect, 
promote and employ human agency is a continuing illuminating theme in the policy 
analysis: in the stress on women’s education, which has now become standard 
worldwide; in the demonstration of the greater longrun efficacy of education and 
discussion than coercion in population policy; and in showing how a democratic 
culture of public information can ‘help citizens to take an interest in the lives of each 
other’ (Dreze & Sen 2002: 378) which underlies democracies’ lesser proneness to 
famine. 
For the new Human Development and Capability Association, which defines 
human development largely in terms of capability, ‘Human Development and Security 
Association’ might have been a title with more information content. It would have 
pointed to the aspects that the sister discourse of human security adds (Gasper 2005b). 
‘Capability’ remains though the highlighted label. What, one must then check, is the 
capability ‘approach’ an approach to? If it sees itself as an approach to the 
understanding, evaluation and promotion of human well-being, then the label ‘Human 
Development and Capability’ is agreeable and encouraging. It brings an onus on the 
capability approach to continue to extend and adapt. 
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5  OPERATIONALIZATION: FROM THE PURITY OF CONCEPTS TO 
THE DEMANDS OF PRACTICE 
 
‘Operationalization’ 
The operationalization of an approach includes its institutionalization and its 
conversion into feasible procedures of application, sometimes including 
quantification. Both institutionalization and application involve adaptations to fit 
specific contexts. Sometimes adaptation involves simplification but equally often it 
requires complication, instead or in addition. 
In looking at experiences in development policy with the dissemination of new 
policy-related approaches, McNeill (2005) finds three standard dangers. First, fatal 
conceptual fuzziness may emerge as all and sundry take up and twist the approach’s 
terms. Second, sometimes in reaction, academics far from the policy frontline can 
over-refine the approach and the debate, rendering it arcane and remote to potential 
users. Third, as ‘practical men’ go their own way in operationalization, the approach 
can become bastardized and lose its rationale. McNeill thinks that the Human 
Development approach has been spared somewhat from the first danger, evisceration 
of meaning, because it has had a focus and edge through being explicitly opposed to 
taking economic growth as top priority. In addition its concepts have a fairly rich 
theoretical basis from the capability approach. Similarly, it has fared relatively well 
on the third front because its theoreticians have been involved with operationalization 
too. 
Looking more narrowly, at the capability approach, one might be less 
sanguine. The approach may not have been worked out yet as carefully as it requires, 
perhaps because of tendencies to become a sect, a church, something that Haq warned 
against. We do not, it is true, require sharp definitions for all purposes. Often major 
advances occur despite obscurities, as seen in the history of economic theory with 
terms like ‘utility’ and ‘value’. The very vagueness can draw in people from diverse 
backgrounds. We do need sufficient contrast with existing concepts to steer attention 
in new directions. The capability concept and criterion serve at least as procedural 
injunctions: look at reasoningly valued opportunities rather than at (only) outcomes or 
unassessed opportunities, and keep this in mind to guide the judgements that are 
involved in practice. Problems arise though when basic issues of rationale and 
formulation are not sufficiently considered before or during practice,   22
‘operationalization’. Dangers in leaving the capability approach vague and highly 
flexible could include failure to develop and refine theory, and proneness to 
operationalize by reversion to familiar, conservative forms that are not consistent with 
the approach’s rationale. Operationalization could become dominated by: 
•  economism, as in a notion of a separate sphere of ‘economic welfare’ 
•  unreflective liberalism, as in a tendency to weaken the ‘have reason to value’ 
clause, into just ‘value’ or ‘want’, and to adopt unreflective versions of SWB 
•  a preoccupation with quantification above institutionalization, despite the 
interest in democracy 
•  considerations of ease of availability of data (such as SWB statements). 
Several of these dangers may arise with the Human Development Index. An approach 
that began by distancing itself from GNP per capita, here brings that into its 
(popularly perceived) core. While granting the other strengths of the Index – 
calculability, palatability, and a vivid message – this is a serious price to pay, for it 
tacitly undermines the capability approach’s original rationale.
11 An input category 
(income) whose relation to both subjective well-being and (other) valued functionings 
has been shown to be often very weak and unreliable, becomes reinstated as one 
supposed aspect of well-being or as a good proxy for that aspect (Gasper 2005a). 
Hopefully that tendency will be well countered in other work. 
Let us look at key problems that arise in trying to work with the concept of 
‘capability’ and at the available responses. 
 
The central concept: capability – problems and dangers 
Several aspects of Sen’s ‘capability’ concept make it difficult to work with. The 
concept draws on but diverges from everyday language. As a result, a number of 
notions need to be distinguished, as Nussbaum does: (a) inborn potentials, or P-
capabilities, (b) trained potentials which constitute skills, abilities and aptitudes, or S-
capabilities, and (c) Sen’s sense, attainable outcomes or O-capabilities, which are the 
joint implication of environmental opportunities and a person’s abilities.
12 Everyday 
                                                 
11 The Human Development Index in fact applies a major discount to per capita incomes above the 
international average, but this is not known to its main audiences and anyway does not obviate the main 
objections to GNP figures as welfare measures: that, besides ignoring distribution, they count as 
benefits 1. huge ranges of things which are costs, and 2. things whose growth displaces non-monetized 
things that would have been of greater benefit.  
12 P = potential; S = skill, O = option or opportunity; see Gasper (1997, 2002, or 2003).   23
language mostly uses sense (b), but Sen has not elaborated his vocabulary to make 
this clear, nor related his usage to the different vocabulary in fields of education and 
training.
13 Although Nussbaum’s labels for the concepts of capability are prone to 
being misunderstood, this is remediable. We discuss next four aspects that are more 
difficult. 
First, ‘capability’ is a hypothetical concept, and the notion of ‘attainable’ is 
hard to specify. Second, ‘capability’ must in use be an evaluative concept for we need 
to focus on attainable favourably valued functionings n-tuples, not simply all 
attainable n-tuples. The set of favourably valued opportunities is however hard to 
identify or compare. Third, it is an unusual intermediary between OWB and SWB 
concepts, though closer to the former than the latter, which are descriptive concepts 
about the feelings attached to actual functionings. Fourth, it has two versions: well-
being freedom and agency freedom; and draws on the appeal of the latter while being 
mostly elaborated in terms of the former. 
 
The elusiveness of an opportunity concept 
The capability concept concerns attainable opportunities. It refers to what could be, to 
the future. It lacks an explicit time-dimension: implicitly well-being freedom refers to 
the rest of an agent’s life, and agency freedom refers to the rest of history, if the agent 
cares for subsequent generations, subsequent life and non-life, or ongoing general 
causes. Long extended chains in capability analysis are indeed not merely possible, 
they are the rule. Perhaps the most central capabilities concern health and those 
conveyed through education. Both cases involve long extended processes.
14 
Since ‘capabilities are an inherently prospective idea… This interpretation 
brings in the issue of the uncertainty of current and future alternatives. What matters 
for the measurement of capabilities is not only the possibility, but also the 
probability to achieve an n-tuple of functionings. This raises, in turn, other questions 
such as the proper time horizon in the evaluation of capabilities and the opportunity to 
                                                 
13 Note, for example, a substantial body of work in British vocation-oriented education which called 
itself ‘the capabilities approach’, and the Latin American work on ‘capacitation’ (introduced in Carmen 
2000). 
14 This contributes to the syndrome wherein health (a set of functionings) and education (a set of inputs, 
or of S-capabilities) become each referred to as (O-)capabilities. For example, Robeyns 2005: 95-6, 
‘[The capability approach] asks whether [1a] people are being healthy [a functioning], and whether the 
means or resources necessary for [1b] this capability are present … It asks whether [2a] people are 
well-nourished [a functioning], and whether the conditions for [2b] this capability…are being met.’ 
(Italics and enumeration added)   24
allow for varying time horizons for different functionings’ (Brandolini and D’Alessio 
2000: 14). Harder yet, questions arise about the meaning of ‘can achieve’. ‘Can 
achieve’ under what assumptions about the rest of the world? ‘Can attain’ when we 
take into account the person’s mental frailties (Harrison 2001: 15)? 
If we could formulate such hypothetical scenarios, perhaps using fuzzy set 
concepts, how could we plausibly estimate them? How can one say what are the life-
opportunities open to a specific person? 
The knowledge of capability sets required for judging whether [a science 
teacher’s] capability set is better or worse than someone else's requires 
information that is simply unavailable. It is not a conventional problem of 
asymmetric information -- as though the science teacher knows his capability set, 
but lacks appropriate incentives for revealing it. The problem is that he has no 
access to it. 
Indeed the problem is not merely epistemological. Why suppose that people face 
determinate capability sets, that there is a determinate answer to the question: 
What would have happened had the teacher decided to stick with physics, or try 
his hand as an actor? Whatever the metaphysics of the case, our evidence never 
reaches the full range of alternatives lying within reach, but extends to actual 
functioning and a limited range of counterfactual variations (Cohen 1993: 9).
15 
One can only proceed by using simplifying and standardizing assumptions. In 
particular, one might have to look at representative standard individuals, not 
idiosyncratic real individuals, and use standard human values, not idiosyncratic 
individual preferences. 
 
Can the capability concept only be practicably operationalized in terms of standard 
human values? 
‘Capability’ in practical use will refer not to all the opportunities the person (or group) 
has but to all those which she (/it) ‘has reason to value’. This makes the approach’s 
call for equality of effective freedom difficult to interpret, other than in the adapted 
but workable form of a call for universal attainment of target levels of basic freedoms. 
A call for equality of capability concerns equality of access to reasoningly valued 
functionings, whether valued by the individual or by some legitimate social process 
(Features 4 and 5). But when individuals do the valuation of their situations then they 
each value different functionings and the criterion of equality becomes in practice 
unworkable, warns Thomas Pogge. Similarly, to demand ‘equality in the space of 
capabilities’ may not be relevant if we see capability as agency-freedom rather than 
                                                 
15 Another version of the passage is published in Cohen (1995), p.287; this version is more forceful.   25
own-wellbeing-freedom. How can we specify equality not in terms of ability to 
achieve own-wellbeing but in terms of ability to achieve one’s goals? Equality in 
fulfilling one’s ambitions? What of the person who has none, versus the person whose 
ambitions are immense? The approach has insisted that it is not restricted to basic 
capabilities alone, but concludes Pogge, in both principle and in practice ‘What 
matters for capability theorists is each person’s ability to promote typical or standard 
human ends – and not: each person’s ability to promote his or her own particular 
ends’ (2003: 34). This is the logic behind the MDGs and some other variants of 
feature 6: that universal possession of a set of basic capabilities is both a more 
operational and a more appropriate criterion. 
 
An Objective Well-Being category…that is operationalized via SWB measures? 
In a group decision context, especially in a public policy context, almost inevitably 
much valuing is by representatives and/or experts for others, and an operational 
concept of capability inclines even more towards OWB rather than SWB. Even in the 
private context,  judgements of  ‘capability’  will  partner  judgements of  OWB, since 
 
Fig. 4 
Well-being judgements for an individual 
(QOL = quality of life) 
  BY FEELINGS 
(asking: how does the 
person feel?) 
BY BOTH FEELINGS 
AND NON-FEELINGS 
BY NON-FEELINGS 
(asking: what can 
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SWB 
5 – In some QOL* 
studies (usually just as 
one component of QOL) 
9 – In some QOL* 
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and eudaimonic SWB 
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one component of 
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(Only a part capability 
measure since it is not 
only about attainable 
options) 
10 – In some QOL* 
studies (usually 
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SWB 
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conception 
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they concern reasoningly valued options not direct feelings. Figure 4 indicates this.
16 
Covering also well-being judgements for or in a collectivity, the table indicates three 
different capability measures, shown in bold. Three other italicized cells have some 
flavour as measures of capability.  
We saw that the concept of capability as opportunity freedom arose out of 
dissatisfaction with SWB as a valuative measure. Interestingly, some recent work 
within the capability approach considers rehabilitating SWB: direct personal 
valuations of one’s life (see: Comim 2005; Comim & Teschl 2005). This is motivated 
by the attractions of SWB as a readily operationalizable measure, by liberal 
inclinations, and hope that SWB’s limitations can be eliminated. 
Adaptive preference concerns not only the adjustment of preferences 
‘downwards’ to cope with scarcity, which is the case of consolation (Comim 2005: 
165), but also adjustment ‘upwards’ in face of plenty, which is the case of jading, and 
in addition and more generally the moulding of preferences.
17 SWB literature does not 
show the absence or rarity of adaptive preference (Teschl & Comim, p.232), but its 
ubiquity, as in the steadily corroborated ‘Easterlin paradox’, and more generally in 
cultural moulding.
18 One recent survey for example identified Nigerians as the 
happiest people in the world; another cites several Latin American countries similarly. 
In Easterlin-paradox behaviour, the jaded affluent report no sustained improvement in 
felt well-being when their incomes grow beyond around US $15,000 per capita per 
annum. Research has found that real income, particularly above that level, is not a 
good predictor of SWB over time although it has better predictive power cross-
sectionally (richer people are happier than poorer people in a given country at a given 
time; cf. Teschl & Comim, pp. 237, 242).
19 Arguably, part of the explanation is not 
only that people beyond US$ 15,000 per annum become inured to and unappreciative 
                                                 
16 As in SWB studies, we take what-is-assessed, not assessment by self/others, as the master dimension 
for distinguishing SWB and OWB; thus, the horizontal dimension not the vertical dimension in figure 
4. 
17 Probably at least as important as (1) adjustment downwards of aspirations by the poor, are (2) 
adjustment upwards of aspirations by those who enter markets and are moulded by new influences, and 
(3) content shifts in aspirations, rather than gross ‘upwards’/’downwards’ shifts – for example, decline 
in aspiration in spheres of religion and family interaction while aspirations for monetarily-related 
achievement increase.  
18 SWB research shows also considerable unreliability in people’s memories of their past felt well-
being. 
19 The ‘dynamic life-span perspective’ would seem to endorse rather than refute the ‘hedonic treadmill’ 
(Teschl & Comim, p.239): jading or satiation of existing preferences frequently leads to emergence of 
new interests, and new activity, to attain the same level of fulfilment that had earlier wilted.   27
of good living, but that the content of what they can obtain with money beyond that 
level is not what, consciously or unconsciously, they find important for good living. 
But there is still abundant evidence of adaptive preference.
20 Whether preference 
adaptations are functional and desirable or not (Comim 2005: 165-6) is a different 
matter from whether SWB is a good or bad measure of wellbeing. Adaptation is often 
functional but renders SWB a flawed measure of wellbeing for public purposes. 
 
‘Agency’ and ‘well-being’ variants of capability; SWB as an agency-freedom proxy? 
Sen has two concepts of O-capability: ‘well-being freedom’, a person’s attainable life 
alternatives, which can be valued in terms of those features in her own life which she 
values or disvalues; and ‘agency freedom’, the futures attainable by the person, 
described in terms of those features of existence (her own or anyone or anything 
else’s) which she (dis)values. ‘Agency freedom’ could perhaps better be called goal-
capability. While the capability approach is operationalized in terms of well-being 
freedom, much of its appeal may come from ‘agency freedom’, which is however 
peculiarly difficult to operationalize. 
No problem arises if the two types of capability are highly and reliably 
correlated. But a reason for having two sets of capability concept is because they are 
liable to diverge. Some of Sen’s examples concern situations where agency 
achievement and own well-being achievement are not well correlated: (i) the wife and 
mother who willingly subordinates her own well-being to the expectations and 
interests of her husband and family; and (ii) the political hunger-striker who damages 
her well-being in order to promote other valued goals. One can add: (iii) the consumer 
addicted to excess who undermines the futures of her children and grandchildren. In 
the first and third cases one asks how much effective freedom the agent in fact had. 
Both SWB and OWB can reflect the other goals that individuals value besides 
their own direct well-being; the progress of a person’s wider causes can influence 
both her happiness and her health. SWB in particular could reflect agency-
achievement, which perhaps explains some of the observed divergences between the 
movements of economic variables, OWB, and SWB (Gasper 2005a). To return to 
SWB as a capability measure is, as we saw, tempting: the measure is readily available 
and has liberal credentials. Teschl & Comim further propose that ‘given greater 
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freedom, Sen assumes that the influence of APF [adaptive preference formation] 
would be much reduced in the creation of people’s values and wants’ (2005: 235).
21 Is 
such an assumption, whether or not in fact made by Sen, plausible? How much greater 
freedom, and reduced how much? Will it justify rehabilitation of SWB as a capability 
measure for a significant set of cases? 
The proposition about the impact of freedom on APF could be sustainable as a 
tautology when freedom is defined accordingly, but otherwise SWB research does not 
seem to support this set of views. The many strong factors that distort measurement of 
SWB and influence the feelings of SWB that we seek to measure are ubiquitous, parts 
of socialization and the pursuit of goals. They can affect not only standard hedonic 
SWB measures but also eudaimonic SWB measures. In addition, while measurement 
approaches exist to counter the distortions in measurement and the contortions of 
feeling, measures that strongly modulate, regulate and distance subjectivity might 
perhaps better be described as OWB measures. Further, SWB would be a candidate 
proxy for agency achievement not agency freedom. Freedom not matched by 
achievement would often be a source of frustration, subjective ill-being, so that 
agency freedom and SWB can easily move in opposite directions. Income is an 
alternative measure of agency freedom, but extremely imperfect since so much of life 
passes outside the reach of money or can be undermined by it. The appeal of GNP to 
many governments as a performance measure is indeed not as a societal well-being 
measure but as a measure of power: power to acquire arms, properties, personnel, and 
other sources of more power. 
So, whether SWB is a good variable with which to reflect agency concerns is 
questionable. SWB still has genuine claims to attention on grounds of inherent 
significance (Gasper 2004a). As in many contemporary studies of quality of life, we 
can simply include an SWB dimension (or dimensions) as one (or more) dimension(s) 
in the larger set of relevant dimensions, and add ways of measuring both ability to 
choose and engagement in choice. 
Faced with this panoply of complications in turning Sen’s capability notion 
into something to work with, one compares the alternatives or reduced forms. Cohen 
(1995) and Pogge (2003) advise that we look instead at Rawlsian primary goods, 
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except in extreme cases of destitution or disability where Sen’s arguments against a 
focus on means in order to assess advantage and disadvantage have special force. 
Fleurbaey (2002) advises that we measure functionings – as in practice is nearly 
always done – but including the functioning of choosing; Sen (2002) counsels him to 
add the functioning of having choices. Others advise in effect that we follow the 
MDG strategy, a modified capability approach but with a strong focus on primary 
goods. Finally, one might conclude that the key empirical and policy foci, besides 
functionings, are ‘S-capabilities’ – people’s skills and powers – rather than, or in 
addition to, what people notionally can attain. 
 
Institutionalization 
The points so far arise from looking at conceptual and epistemological obstacles, not 
yet at political and organizational obstacles. Let us return to feature 5, that 
prioritizations should come through public reason and debate, and specifically through 
participation and democratic choice.
22 Given the legions and diversity of relevant 
capabilities, and the constraints to making political choice processes simultaneously 
feasible, participatory and equitable, workable operationalizations of capability 
analysis may be very simplified in this area too. One should remember though that 
complex tasks can be adapted into series of simplified feasible tasks within complex 
systems. 
Feature 6, a list of priority capabilities, is one attempt to be realistic about 
institutionalization. According to Robeyns, Nussbaum’s emphasis on a list is part of a 
focus on what ‘citizens have a right to demand from their government (Nussbaum, 
2003a). Sen’s capability approach, in contrast, need not be so focused on claims on 
the government, due to its wider scope. … Nussbaum has been criticized for her belief 
in a benevolent government.’ (Robeyns 2005: 105). In reality, legal constitutions exist 
more to constrain and steer governments than because of belief in their benevolence. 
Further, the demands advanced through a legal system, including demands to be 
enforced by government if that is required by the constitution or other laws, include 
claims against any and all members of the society, not only claims against 
government. Nussbaum has a theory of politics in which states and societies have 
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complex institutional structures and democracy is not reducible to direct democracy 
and continuous plebiscites. Stress on public discourse and rational scrutiny must be 
combined with understandings of political power and organizational process and 




Sen’s capability approach arose from a dissatisfaction with both of subjective states 
and command over resources as concepts or measures of well-being or advantage, and 
from the wish for a concept that presents persons as reasoners with the right to make 
choices; in sum, from concerns for people as diverse, thinking, adaptive agents 
(Section 2).  
The approach contains six characteristic elements: (1) a broad orientation in 
valuation to use more sources of information than only information on outcomes, let 
alone monetizable outcomes; (2) a language—of ‘capability’, ‘functionings’ and so 
on—with which to insightfully structure such information; (3) a normative 
prioritization, to one degree or other, of the category of capability, in making 
decisions; (4) a reliance on reasoned valuation by persons in ordering their own 
capabilities, real or potential; (5) a reliance on reasoned democratic discussion by 
groups in ordering and selecting between opportunities for the group; and (6) 
elements that could set limits on the prioritizations permissible through features 4 and 
5, including a category, and possibly a list of, basic capabilities. Section 3 concluded 
that in order to be an ‘approach’ the capability approach must contain more than a 
concept and a criterion; and that it indeed contains additional ideas about 
prioritization through reasoned valuation, public debate and legitimate and democratic 
process. Amongst the relevant possible products of such valuation, debate and 
process, we can say, are the Universal Declaration and the MDGs.  
The catholic stance on types of information (feature 1) and the normative 
prioritization of one type (feature 3) are combined with an attempt to face policy 
realities through features 4 to 6. Features 1 and 6 are not novel; features 2 and 3 are 
much more so; as are—in an economics context—features 4 and 5 with their stress on 
reflection and debate as opposed to assumptions of given, fully-formed and fixed   31
preferences or of ‘de gustibus non est disputandum’ (‘tastes are not open to 
discussion’, the classical tag repeated by Gary Becker).  
Over time, the approach’s concern for human agency has brought increasing 
stress on process freedom and feature 4, making one’s own choices, and/or on feature 
5, participation in group choices; but feature 5 remains seriously underdeveloped.  
We saw a number of tensions within the set: between features 1 and 3, within 
feature 4, and between features 4, 5 and 6. The tensions are not necessarily failings 
but reflect realities of policy practice and attempts to construct a balanced system. 
Tension between features 5 and 6 can be mitigated by refined specification of the 
character of a list of proposed priority(/’basic’) capabilities. 
The tensions between, and different emphases on, these diverse elements lead 
to various different versions, even as presented by the same author or by authors who 
think they are in agreement. A shared stance that capability is a relevant informational 
space in evaluation is far from constituting a shared approach. Managing the tensions 
occurs partly through vagueness and ambiguity, which is problematic. To distinguish 
and work with several variants, each perhaps adapted to a different context, could be 
more useful, including for testing and amendment.  
Tensions and dangers increase as we move from theorization to 
operationalization (Section 5). Sen’s capability concept is peculiarly hard to 
operationalize, for it concerns hypothetical attainments of (in practice, favourably 
valued) functionings n-tuples, and is an unusual intermediary concept, a type of OWB 
with an SWB flavour. Major simplifications may be required in operationalization, 
with a danger of inappropriate reductions when the approach’s rationale is not kept 
clear.
23  
An example of inappropriate reduction is use of the notion of a separate sphere 
of ‘economic welfare’, for which per capita GNP is supposedly a satisfactory 
indicator. Such an operationalization tacitly undermines the original rationale of the 
capability approach.  
A second example of distortion or transformation in much operationalization 
is the weakening of Feature 4’s clause ‘have reason to value’, into just ‘value’ or 
‘want’, and adoption of unreflective versions of SWB as measures of advantage. The 
paradox arises that an approach which arose by distancing itself from SWB 
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sometimes now re-allies with it, as supposedly a good measure of agency achievement 
(or even agency freedom) or as liberally sound. This could be more than a mere fine-
tuning of the balance between CA’s well-being orientation and agency orientation, for 
the CA’s very rationale lay in a distinction between considered and unconsidered 
lives, between reasoningly valued as opposed to directly felt well-being.   
The MDGs and similar basic-capabilities-list formulations are also drastically 
simplified operationalizations, but potentially defensible. From Feature 3’s injunction 
to approach development and equality with strong reference to capability, they focus 
appropriately on representative standard individuals, and priority aspects of access or 
functioning in terms of universal basic values, not idiosyncratic personal features or 
wishes. They form a workable point of attention, usable to put pressure on real 
governments and hold them accountable. 
Overall, the approach’s additional ideas about prioritization (features 4 and 5, 
even feature 6) are underdeveloped. To go beyond the familiar--that what matters is 
the content of living and the amounts and distribution of effective freedom, not the 
amounts of income and expenditure--the capability approach has to connect to more 
theoretical apparatus and empirical basis (see e.g. Deneulin 2006), not only implicit 
residues from liberal economics and philosophy.  
This conclusion is endorsed, not refuted, by the thriving state of capability 
studies. The required theoretical and empirical deepening are being attempted. 
Compared to a decade back, we see a major research effort, a scientific association, 
regular conferences at which many disciplines, nationalities and topics are seriously 
represented, and policymaker attention not only within the UN system but influence in 
many countries and even the World Bank. There was a danger that the capability 
approach’s success in being quickly adopted by the bigger approach to which it 
contributes – the human development approach – would freeze it at an immature 
stage. On balance however the bigger approach seems now to instil required energy, 
urgency, and sense of proportion.   33
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